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Economic nationalism underpinned the Second Postwar Era of nationalizations 
of electrical sectors. Then, peripheral countries enjoyed an industrial surge along 
with electrification progress. This paper examines what had happened in the 
Portuguese electrification before the first step to “domestication” and 
nationalization in 1944. Then, cooperation between foreign and domestic 
operators with the Government made a great leap forward to the country’s 
electrification. This intervention was based on the assumption that foreign 
companies had not been willing to fully foster the electrification of this poor 
country during the interwar period. The Portuguese case confirms that 
international holding-groups eventually determined the pace of adoption of this 
public intervention, but also claims that the responsibility for this state of affairs 




Since the recent opening of the black box of electricity sector nationalizations 
during the post-Second World War period, some factors unconnected with 
economic nationalism have come to light. The notion of electricity infrastructures 
as public goods and electricity markets as natural monopolies subject to 
regulation had been covered under this umbrella. The neo-institutional literature 
has highlighted, however, that the profits of international electricity companies 
had not always been extraordinary, even though they achieved market power. 
Their forms of entrepreneurship would have been adopted their profiles more for 
defensive than predatory reasons, in view of the inherent risk of their investments 
and, in short, the nationalization of the electricity sectors would not have taken 
place anyway, unless proposed by the foreign companies themselves. After the 
Great Depression, reduction in their profitability would have precipitated the 
demand for "domestication" and public intervention
2
. However, this thought-
provoking hypothesis would require some fine-tuning, if the variety of rhythms 
and different aspects of the nationalizations are taken into consideration.   
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Participation in the global electrification of Portugal, a peripheral and poor 
country during the inter-war period, offers an interesting vantage point insofar as 
its electrification matched perfectly well the pattern of global electrification of 
Hertner, Wilkins and Hausman (2008). The Portuguese case, however, once 
again gives relevance to economic nationalism as an independent variable in 
little-developed peripheral country, and above all it makes it clear that market 
and company size were both important. Lisbon and Porto were two diverse 
markets supplied electricity by different generation procedures and by two 
subsidiaries of two very different-sized international holding companies. The 
difference in size might be as great as the difference in their capacity to influence 
the decision of public intervention, which was what provided the final impetus to 
the electrification of the country, from 1944 onwards.  
Electrification was certainly a global process from the early stages in the last 
decades of 19th century up the 2
nd
 World War, when the continuous worldwide 
transfer of technology and capital was virtually interrupted. In the European 
Peripheries, a marked electrification performance including the building up of 
regional markets went hand in hand with them becoming the recipient of large 
shares of international flows of capital during the inter-war period
3
. In the 
Southern periphery, e.g. Italy and Spain, the American holding-groups 
contributed extensively to fund the financial needs of some of the largest 
electricity supply systems
4
. In contrast, electricity markets in Portugal remained 
essentially underdeveloped until the second half of 20
th
 century. The absence of a 
steady flow of foreign capital and entrepreneurship has been argued as a key 
factor for the backwardness of the Portuguese electricity sector, though the two 
main markets for electricity in Portugal i. e. Porto and Lisbon were being headed 
by foreign companies during these years. These firms showed no intention of 
leaving the country, but electricity lines hardly expanded beyond both city limits 
during those times. Both generating utilities and transmission lines supplied 
essentially local markets until the Government fostered an ambitious 
electrification project in 1944, the Lei 2,002. It was based on the collaboration 
amongst private companies in a scheme ordered and backed by governmental 
organisms5. The necessary economies of scale were only achieved when huge 
investments were made in dam-building and regional transmission lines6. 
Regardless the cooperation between foreign and domestic operators with the 
Government made it finally possible; this first step to Nationalization was based 
on the assumption that private companies had not been willing to fully foster the 
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 3 
This paper examines what had happened in the Portuguese electrification before 
the decided intervention of the Government in ruling its development. Firstly, 
this implies analyzing the reasons why markets in Portugal were almost 
neglected by the international flows of capital which drowned the Peripheries in 
the 1920s. A regional approach may shed some light on this topic, since this 
American wave of capital was diverted to exceptionally profitable markets and 
the Portuguese prominent electricity markets were likely to be lucrative but 
small. A view in the early implementation of nationalistic policies in Portugal 
during the early thirties may also clarify this point. Nationalistic policies might 
have obstructed electrification projects coming from abroad to prevent foreign 
capital from a major progress. Secondly, some attention is addressed to the 
foreign companies already settled in Portugal since they also deferred the transfer 
of capital at some point. On the one hand, the paper focuses on the small, the 
União Eléctrica Portuguesa (UEP); dependent upon the Spanish holding-group 
headed by Banco de Vizcaya through Electra del Lima. UEP operated in the 
Porto region and was eager to enlarge its insufficient demand with new lines to 
deliver energy to remote markets of electricity, but neither the Portuguese 
managers nor specially the Government would easily accept its crucial 
enlargement of the market. On the other hand, some attention is devoted to 
Companhias Reunidas Gás e Electricidade (CRGE); the electricity company in 
Lisbon associated to a huge international holding-group, i.e. Sofina. Until late 
1930s, CRGE had no need of building a regional market as thermoelectricity 
assured the company the best profitable records in a small but lucrative market 
like the city of Lisbon. In 1944, Portuguese electricity markets were certainly so 
narrow that the indispensable increase of scale of the supply sector would hardly 
come without the collaboration of a public operator. The Government was 
essential to guarantee the endeavor while the companies provided funds and 
technological skills. The Portuguese case confirms that foreign companies 
certainly determined the pace of adoption of this public intervention, but also 
highlights that nationalistic policies on behalf of the Government bear a great 
deal of the responsibility for this state of affairs8. 
 
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section one deals with the historical 
background of the early role played by Electrical holding-groups in the European 
Peripheries. Section two presents the case of the modest electrification of 
Portugal. Section three introduces the Governmental policies. Section four and 
five explores the evolution of UEP in Porto and section six that of CRGE in 
Lisbon. The paper ends with some final remarks.  
 
1. Electrification as an international issue 
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 4 
Electrification as a global process has overlapped successive globalization waves 
during 20
th
 century. In the Peripheries, electrification went hand in hand with the 
internationalization of electrical companies from its very beginnings to the 
1940s. According to Hausman, Hertner and Wilkins (2008), foreign ownership 
and control of electric utilities was only resumed in the 1980s when market 
regulation loosened, but the internationalization of companies and holding-
groups promoting electrification in the first decades of the 20
th
 century was 
almost universal and so were the first and subsequent waves of international 
transfer of technology and capital.  
 
In the early times (1889-1905), electro-technical conglomerates were responsible 
for the circulation of flows of the new inventions and machinery. The electric 
technology had flourished here and there, so competition was fierce among 
different groups, which pursued to impose their rights through patents and the 
application of the Unternehmergeschäft strategy. The pioneers were both British 
and American companies which settled down branches abroad since 1880 
onwards. The main groups were the American General Electric and the 
European Siemens-Schuckert, and Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG), 
which constituted an independent branch of Edison for Europe. Here and there, 
electricity supply firms were created following a pattern of satellite companies 
and flourished in every single important city in Europe. This cycle finished as 
soon as did the battle of the systems and the expansion of the electrification of 




As of 1905, the financial requirements of the electrical industry grew 
enormously10. This process was closely related to the internationalization of 
electrical companies. The scale of the long-distance transmission lines, the 
electric utilities and the management of electrical systems were multiplied, as 
were their financial needs. More specifically, hydro-electrical firms were capital-
intensive and this entailed a continuous and huge flow of capital. Hydro-electric 
assets were fixed and they could not be removed and used for other activities. 
Investing in hydroelectricity implied sunk costs and the investment did not yield 
any short term pay-backs. In addition, financial needs did not come to an end 
once the water-power systems were launched
11
. The electrical firms were 
involved in an endless process of absorbing not only intensive-consumers e.g. 
chemical industries, but also competitors, i.e. smaller electricity companies, so as 
to build regional monopolies. The role played by the international electrical 
conglomerates also included a sophisticated supply of human capital for building 
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 5 
Foreign investment in water-powered companies has emerged as particularly 
hazardous
13
. Firstly, as demand-elasticity of electricity abroad was unknown, the 
short-term returns of the business were insecure. Secondly, the companies 
attempted to keep under control the rates of foreign exchange of capital flowing 
in both senses. Pursuing to overcome all this trouble, American investors created 
companies ad-hoc and new financial tools. Thus, before the World War II, two 
main categories of companies were widespread by the internationalization of 
electricity firms, namely the operating and the holding companies. The financial 
institutions that supported these new firms were not investment banks, but 
financial syndicates and holding groups. For instance, the Canadian electricity 
syndicates, which stood for both abundant capital and electrical engineering 
capacities, backed the electrification of some promising manufacturing markets: 
the US, Brazil, México and Spain during the early 20
th
 century14.  
 
During the 1920s, the usual imported components for building up a hydro-
electrical system were the following: electro-technical equipment, the technical 
management of the hydro-systems and particularly large amounts of capital ready 
to be invested. However, some domestic expertise was also needed. The 
international electricity firms required local information on natural resources, 
authorization and license procedures, apart from a complete knowledge of energy 
demand. Finally, domestic advice was also essential regarding institutional 
lobbying and networking15. While local managers suffered from the constant 
pressure of costumers and local authorities in order to improve the electricity 
service, Neufeld (2008) conversely predicts that foreign investors were not 
confidence in the return of sunk costs16. Nelles (2003) has suggested the use of 
“the operating rate” (the income share devoted to supporting the operational 
costs) to gauge this relationship. The variations of this index may constitute a 
good indicator of the bargaining between the group of foreign investors and the 
local managers.  
 
After the 1929 World Depression, most international electricity companies 
gradually lost their interest in expanding their investments abroad since new 
regulations on public service rates were implemented along with the 
augmentation of infrastructure requirements. An “indigenization” wave 
encompassed the unhurried took over of the majority of the assets of these 
international companies by public sectors. These events have been interpreted 
following arguments identical to those pertaining to the ascent of state regulatory 
bodies. According to Public Interest view, nationalization occurred because the 
nationalistic ideology in the post-second-war Era had advanced enormously 
among policy-makers: the market could not handle the provision of a country’s 
basic infrastructure during the 2
nd
 World War, when the shortages of fuel had put 
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 6 
strong pressure on the expansion of electric energy resources
17
. Nevertheless, the 
Capture Hypothesis posited that the companies even wished for it, as they had 





Regardless the electricity sector in Portugal fit fairly well the pattern of global 
electrification, electricity lines were still confined to the cities’ limits and the 
regional markets were hardly developed in the early 1930s. Thus, fuelling new 
funds was needed to scale up generating infrastructures and transmission lines, 
but these investments were postponed until de 1950s after the Government 
intervention. In line with the Capture Hypothesis, foreign investors had not 
probably been confidence in the pay-backs of these new funds. Surprisingly, the 
electricity-group which suffered an earlier declining return on investment showed 
a greater willingness to expand their market by fuelling new funds. None of their 
initiatives was allowed by the government since administration rulers were likely 
to feel menaced by any foreign initiative. Let us follow this complex process 
with a view on the country, on the Government and on the two parallel paths: the 




2. The electrification of Portugal until 1944: partial and slow 
 
By the end of the 19
th
 century and the early decades of the 20
th
 century, Portugal 
did not become a prominent destination of foreign direct investments. The 
absence of a steady flow of foreign capital and entrepreneurship has been 
recalled as the basic constraint for the expansion of both supply and electricity 
demand: generating utilities and transmission lines as well as industries linked to 
the intensive use of electricity as electrochemical and electro-metallurgy
19
. 
Despite the presence of a bunch of companies controlled by foreign holding-
groups, electricity markets in Portugal remained essentially underdeveloped until 
the 1950s20.  
Portuguese's electricity markets were minute in mid-forties and these small 
markets were hardly connected until the Second World War (See Map 1). During 
the conflict, the companies were compelled to connect their networks, but the 
voltage of the lines was still remarkably low. In fact, the two electricity 
generating systems in the North were connected at 15.000 V in 1941 and 30.000 
V line connecting Lisbon and Setubal was only placed in 1945, whilst 110.000 
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 7 
V’s tension lines were commonly used in both Italy and Spain for transmission 
lines as of 1914
21
.   
 
Map n. 1. Companies' distribution areas in Portugal (1945) 
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Table 1. Electrical Utilities in Portugal (excluding self-production) in 1943 (Power Capacity in kW) 
 Hydro Powered Thermal Powered Total  
Power in kW Plants  Capacity Plants Capacity Plants Capacity 
up to 20 6 58 21 319 27 377 
 21 - 100 16 836 61 3,138 80 3,974 
101-500 14 3,736 25 6,000 39 9,736 
501-1,000 6 4,464 7 5,201 13 9,665 
1,001-5,000 8 23,171 1 3,250 9 26,421 
5,001-... 4 56,824 6 121,046 10 177,870 
Total 54 89,089 121 138,954 178 228,043 
Source: Estatísticas das Instalaçoes eléctricas em Portugal, 1943. 
 
Accordingly, most electricity plants were tiny in the early forties (see Table 1). 
Only ten electricity power-plants were over 5.000 kW and their total capacity did 
not reach 200,000 kW (see Table 2). In the 1930s, the Iberian Electric Ltd. sent a 
Memorandum to the Portuguese Government unfolding the characteristics of the 
domestic market
22
. According to it, electricity markets in Portugal were both tiny 
and scattered. This was the main obstacle for a better driving of its electrification 
performance. Each company had to adapt to a modest local consumption, 
obstructing the achievement of economies of scale (the capital invested per 
installed kW was very high as were the running costs). Reserve facilities should 
be maintained by each company in the absence of interconnecting lines. Thus, 
financial burdens were so high that made electricity service unavailable to many 
cities. Moreover, electricity retailing prices were remarkably high and industrial 
consumers, except some cases, were not able to afford commercial electricity and 
some manufacturers used self-generation. Thus, retailing electricity companies 
supplied essentially lighting, which had an extraordinary impact on the poor rates 
of performance of the electric facilities. As a result, electricity prices followed 
somehow electricity costs
23
.   
 
Table 2. Electric Systems in Portugal, 1940 (in kW) 
System Total Power Capacity Spare Power Capacity Maximum Capacity in 1940 
CRGE 60,000 15,000 32,200 
UEP-Sul 8,200 1,800 4,300 
Alto Alentejo 7,400 2,300 3,800 
Sierra da Estrela* 17,000 4,200 6,570 
UEP-Varosa-Ermal 50,000 5,000 36,500 
Carrís do Lisboa 13,200 3,800 7,600 
Carrís do Porto 11,300  6,000 
Total 167,100 32,100  
Source: CD-EDP: Fundo Ferreira Dias, 39, C1 P3. 
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Some other countries of the Southern periphery, namely Spain and Italy, had 
soon become the recipient of large shares of international flows of capital, firstly 
commanded by British firms and by German and American afterwards. Unlike 
Portugal, the possibilities of expansion opened by hydroelectricity in both Italy 
and Spain especially attracted American holding-groups during the interwar 
period. As can be seen in Figure 1, in these countries, water-power fostered an 
increasing electricity production during the last twenties. A marked 
electrification performance went hand in hand with a period of industrial 
prosperity between the wars. The so-called energy constriction Italy and Spain 
had endured during the 19
th
 century was about to be overcome thanks to 
electricity24.  
 
Figure  1. Electricity output per habitant, 1910-1955 (kWh)* 
 
         Sources: Etemad y Luciani (1991) and Maddison: http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm. 
*Spain, 1937: Spanish civil war. 
 
In Portugal, electricity output rose slowly during the first half of the 20
th
 century. 
In 1940 reached 460.09 GWh, but less than 40 per cent were water-powered, 
whilst in both Italy and Spain hydroelectricity stood out above 90 percent of total 
output during the 1930s
25
. In Portugal, electricity output per head in 1935 was 
50.52 kWh and industrial uses absorbed 26.24 kWh per habitant
26
 and this 





The most dynamic markets for electricity in Portugal were essentially supplied 
by foreign companies through non-exclusive concessions granted by the 
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Municipalities after open-tender procedures. In 1913, Sofina had acquired a 
significant share of capital of the Lisbon’s company, i.e. CRGE, and Porto was 
served with electricity by UEP as of 1923. Regardless having been constituted in 
Portugal, both firms acted as being free-standing companies. Created in order to 
operate only in Portugal, the management of the businesses was kept in hands of 
the foreign investors in Paris or Madrid respectively. These two companies might 
have acted as means for diverting the crucial flows of foreign funds to Portugal. 
However, no regional markets for electricity were accomplished since 
companies' lines did not go far beyond the narrow boundaries of both cities. 
Electricity prices maintained high in both cities as the level of electricity costs 
did
28
, since companies relied on irregular consumers, i.e. lighting and light 
manufacture. Thus, the main electricity markets in Portugal maintained narrow 
and in the remaining of the country electrification seemed poor, in a similar level 
to those pertaining to peripheral countries before the 1
st
 World War. 
 
According to the governmental bodies’ version, having noticed the enormous 
backwardness, the Portuguese government guided a project of electrification as 
of 1944 (Decree 2 002) which planned an important hydro-electrical endeavor by 
stimulating both the supply and the consumption of electricity
29
. During the 
fifties, Portugal started a process of electrification catching up ruled by the State, 
which also favored an unhurried process of “indigenization” of the foreign 
companies of electricity at work in the country, which lasted until 1980s. 
 
3. Portuguese Government and electricity markets before 1944 
 
The electricity sector was left to the ruling of Municipalities in Portugal until 
192630. The City Halls were responsible for granting and extending concessions 
of electricity service. In return, the companies should provide the Municipalities 
with free-of-charge services of street lighting. Thereafter, the Lei dos 
Aproveitamentos Hidráulicos and the Lei da Rede Nacional inaugurated a new 
phase in state intervention31. The government negotiated a significant loan abroad 
in January 192732. Although the expected foreign loan was never obtained, the 
hope of the implementation of a major electrification plan was encouraged in 
1931 when Decree nr. 20,225 declared the government’s intentions to intervene 
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 Return on investment was also high since a loose market regulation was applied. Porto, Bartolomé 
(2012). Lisbon, Bussola (2012). 
29
 Ferreira Dias (1945). 
30
 In 1912, the earlier legislation was the “Regulamento de Instalações electricas”. Government control 
went back as far as 1921 through a representative on the Board of Directors of UEP. A Government 
Delegate was present from 1925. BD-UEP: 03/13/1925. CRGE, Bussola (2012). 
31
 The Lei dos aproveitamentos, 20 October 1926 and Lei da Rede Nacional, 1927. This legislation 
coincided with the Congreso Nacional de Electricidade, 20-22 November 1926. Campos (1938), p. 120 
and Matos (2004). 
32
 In Porto, this legislation overlapped with the municipal project of exploiting water powered electricity 
in the national Douro in Bitetos. in 1930, 18,163 Decree of Diário do Governo. UEP point of view in 
Board of Directors Minutes (BD-UEP) 04/23/1930. 
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in the electrification of Portugal33. The new legislation essentially opened a 
tender after two strong proposals were received from Iberian Electric Limited 
and the Westinghouse Electric International Company34. When the tender was 
closed in January 1932, there were eleven proposals from manufacturing and 
electric-conglomerates all over the world, comprised one from Porto’s UEP. A 
group of Swiss companies won the tender although the Government’s lack of 
capital was argued as the origin of the project’s suspension. In 1933, the attention 
was focused on the River Zêzere and a new proposal arose from Westinghouse --
the Anglo-American group—to invest there with the support of Sofina in 
Lisbon’s CRGE, but it was similarly rejected by the engineer on charge of Junta 
de Electrificaçao, Ferreira Dias35.  
Thus, from 1926 onwards, companies and municipalities regarded the 
forthcoming state intervention as the main variable of future electrification. 
Nevertheless, nothing was effectively done until the 2
nd
 World War. Both 
companies and municipalities linked the future of electrification of Portugal to 
the plans of the Portuguese Administration. Since the central Administration 
project was delayed twenty years, Municipalities and electricity companies had a 
poor stimulus to enlarge their systems over this period, particularly hydro-
powered ones. New facilities implied substantial funds, whilst their municipal 
concessions were extended without improving the old agreements so that they 
would fit the forthcoming market settings.  
Great changes came with the rise of coal prices during the 2
nd
 World War. In the 
transmission cycle, the interconnection of the power stations of northern Portugal 
was ordered in June 1943 to save on foreign coal and maximize the use of the 
available hydroelectric power36. At the generating level, in 1944, the Lei 2,002 
finally implemented Salazar’s plans for the electricity sector. It was based on the 
collaboration between companies and the government in an electrification 
process ordered and planned by government organisms37. The clauses were rigid 
but this meant the existence of a consistent plan which transmitted confidence to 
potential investors. It consisted of the establishment of new companies, namely 
Hidroeléctrica do Cávado and Hidroeléctrica do Zêzere, to exploit large-
capacity hydroelectric power stations on the Zêzere and Cávado-Rabagão rivers, 
following a joint venture model, financed by public and private capital. In 1947, 
a new company, Companhia Nacional de Electricidade (CNE), was also 
founded38. After years of remaining standstill, the collaboration among foreign 
and domestic operators with the state made the progression in the electricity 
sector finally possible and the take-off of the electrification in the whole territory 
of Portugal would take place. As Madureria (2008) posited, the hard version of 
electrification, ruled by the state, succeeded in achieving its goals in a climate of 
increasingly governmental enpowerment. The Government was seemingly 
                                                 
33
 The decree of 13 August 1931, edited in the Diário do Governo on 17 August 1931.  
34
 CD-EDP: FD C5P7. 
35
 21 August 1933, CD-EDP: FD 28 C4P4.  
36
 Order of 7
th
 June 1943 (and the subsequent Decree No. 33.672 of 26
th
 May 1944). 
37
 Madureira (2008, p.18). 
38
 As Madureira (2008, p.14). 
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leading the whole process since the companies’ initiatives were all rejected until 
1944. However, this process remained far from straightforward.  
 
4. UEP in the North: water power in an insufficient market  
The Spanish hydro-electrical group, headed by the Banco de Vizcaya pursued to 
accomplish a role of electricity promoter in North Portugal, taking charge of the 
building up of the Lindoso fall since 1916. This hydro-electrical group had at 
disposal both capacities: capital and some experience in engineering tasks. 
Electra de Lima had been planned in 1908 to supply electricity to the Porto 
region, but it was not until 1921 it obtained the concession for an electricity HT 
line from Lindoso to the city39. Lindoso was located in the river Lima, near the 
Spanish border, and this water-fall was the company's main asset40. The Vizcaya's 
group was also able to mobilize a Portuguese Bank, which actively participated 
in the promotion of UEP, the distribution company in Porto Region.  
 
Figure n. 2. UEP   in the Northern Market: Electricity Output and Transmission Lines 
(Electricity, in kWh on the left; Lines, in Km on the right) 
  
Sources: Board of Directors: Annual Reports. Lima (1924-45) and UEP (1924-1945).  
 
Freixo, a thermal utility in Porto and UEP’s main asset, was planned in 1925 and 
inaugurated in 192841. Some transmission lines were also placed –from Lindoso 
                                                 
39
 Lindoso was planned by Antonio Grasset and purchased in 1919 to the Vizcaya's group. The line's 
concession was granted on September 15, 1921. AHISA-Iberdrola. Notas sobre la Historia de la SA. 
Electra de Lima. 
40
 Lima as a Spanish initiative in Portugal has been depicted in Bartolomé (2009). 
41



































































































































to Braga, Porto and Coimbra—and in 1933, UEP also started buying a company 
in the Setubal Peninsula, the Sociedade de Electrificaçao Urbana e Rurale 
(SEUR) and the process finished in 1941. The firm followed an extensive pattern 
of expansion: raising the demand for electricity was only possible by means of an 
expansion of transmission lines. As can be seen in Figure 2, the pace of growth 
of the UEP's electricity output fuelled to North Portugal was similar to the 
expansion of HT lines, but networks grew faster than electricity before 193842. 
As can be seen in figure 3, the augmentation of UEP’s electricity output went 
hand in hand with a reduction in unit costs, but this decrease was never dramatic. 
UEP served minute markets with hydroelectricity obtained in a small waterfall 
and when they interconnected with other markets and generating plants by a grid 
in the late 1930s they were also minute markets served by small waterfalls as 
well.  
 
Figure n. 3. UEP’s electricity Output (kWh) and unit costs of Electricity (cents of Escudo) 
 
Source: Appendix. Table 3. 
Certainly, once the inner Porto was electrified, the expansion of UEP depended 
upon the building of a regional market for electricity in North Portugal43. This 
stood for the acquisition of water resources in order to enlarge the availability of 
energy when necessary, the purchase of a portion of the capital stock of the rival 
                                                 
42
 The available electricity (included Lima and Freixo) grew at 11.57% in the whole period (1923-45), 
while the lines increased at 13.11%. Between 1924 and 1938, the differences were remarkable: the lines 
expanded at a rate of 18.66% while the electricity increased at 15.14. Figure 2.  
43
 Porto, included the total District, was a small city and the electricity output from Lindoso was clearly 















































































































































Electricity output (South and North) UEP's unit-cost 
Logarithm (UEP's unit costs) 
 15 
companies and, finally, market agreements. Unfortunately, this market-building 
policy ended up with a total failure. 
UEP was never very successful in the first step of that strategy of expanding the 
market by obtaining licenses for the exploitation of water-resources in North 
Portugal. The earliest attempt involved the Cavado-Rabagão streams. In 1906, 
the company Viação Electrica do Porto had got a concession in this area, 
comprised some water-falls near Porto44. In 1920, these water-authorizations 
belonged to the Companhia das Quedas de Agua do Norte de Portugal and one 
fifth of it was maintained in the hands of the Portuguese Administration45. The 
UEP intended to purchase the concession but this proved difficult46. UEP only 
participated in Quedas in 1933 when UEP controlled the Sociedade de Minas de 
Borralha at the time as the Portuguese Government was expected to initiate a full 
electrification scheme in Portugal
47
. 
The Douro basin was the second alternative for increasing the Lindoso 
hydroelectric system48. In 1931, the company acquired the concession –
International Douro-- which the Spanish Group had obtained by means of 
Sociedad de Electrificación Industrial. When this company was liquidated, UEP 
was offered and accepted the authorization although it was never used49. UEP 
applied again to the Portuguese Government, but in a different region: they asked 
permission for exploring the possibilities of the River Ocreza in the Tagus Valley 
in 1941; though it was assigned in 1945 to another company: Companhia de 
Electricidade do Alto Alentejo50. Finally, UEP was also overlooked when the 
most important waterfall concessions were distributed as the public initiative 
increased i.e. Bitetos, in the Portuguese Douro51;  and the River Zêzere in the 
Tagus Valley52.   
In addition to the plans to accumulate hydraulic resources, UEP specifically 
sought to control some electricity markets in the North as the second step of their 
strategy of expanding the electricity market. UEP firstly attempted to get rid of 
                                                 
44
 Matos (2003 b), p. 108. The actual exploitation of the waterpower in Portugal, see Simões (1997). 
45
 In 1920, the company was represented by the Portuguese Bank, Burnay Lda., which stood for the 
interests of the Syndicat Hydroelectrique du Nord du Portugal, where the British Vickers Company was 
mainly represented. Campos (1922), p. 174 and Campos (1938), p. 98 and p. 161. 
46
 In 1927, Motor-Columbus controlled both the project and the company and they wanted to renew the 
license again.  BD-UEP: 02/28/1920 and Accounting Committee (AC)-UEP: 09/09/1920. Also, in UEP 
G4.2.1-4.  Campos (1938), p. 174. 
47
 Borralha retained 27,746 shares of the Companhia das Queda’s de Agua do Norte de Portugal . The 
aim of this purchase was the Sociedade de Electricidade Urbana e Rural (SEUR). BD-UEP: 09/19/1933. 
48
 To my knowledge, there were two attempts to acquire control over coal extraction companies in the 
Northern: in 1922, according to Campos (1938), p. 92; and, in 1927, when the company was about to sign 
a contract with the C. Financiére des Mines. BD-UEP: 07/09/1927 and 09/07/1927. There was also an 
attempt to agree with another company to obtain hydroelectric resources: Saltos de Cabrum. BD-UEP: 
04/01/1930. 
49
 Burnay was also involved in the business. BD-UEP02/05/1931. The exploitation of International Douro 
was technically complex and extremely expensive. Bartolomé (2006). 
50
 BD-UEP: 07/18/1941 and BD-UEP: 01/17/1945. 
51
 Campos (1938), p. 161-162 and BD-UEP: 10/31/1929.  
52
 Up to 1937, Zezere was under the control of Viaçao Electrica do Porto, which then stood for Sofina in 
North Portugal. FD 29-C5-P7. The news of the expiry of the water-authorisation in FD 41-C4-P1 
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competitors by means of taking control of its rivals, but as this policy was not 
successful, UEP had to reach market agreements.   
 
UEP started serving the Municipalities of Braga and Vilanova de Gaia in 192053 
and in 1927, UEP’s lines reached Coimbra and a contract was signed between the 
City Hall and the company until 194054. In 1923, the lines had reached the main 
market, the city of Porto and the first contract was signed between the Serviços 
Municipalisados de Gás e Electricidade de Porto (SMGE) and UEP. This 
granted the UEP’s exclusive control over the provision of hydroelectricity to this 
city. From the beginning, in the early 1920s, the UEP had to deal with a 
segmented electricity market in the city of Porto. The firm had to share this 
market with SMGE, which had exclusive retailing rights for any customer under 
50 kW of capacity, and also the tramway company; Companhia dos Carrís de 
Ferro do Porto
55
. However, the struggle began in 1925, when the UEP’s 
privileges were strongly threatened by the Companhia Electrica de Varosa and 
by the Companhia Electro-Hidraulica de Portugal (CEHP)56. UEP attempted to 
control CEHP by negotiating with Varosa, but following the breakdown of 
negotiations, Varosa and CEHP ultimately merged and became Companhia 
Hidroelectrica do Norte de Portugal, CHENOP, and this improved their power 
to bargaining with its main competitor in the City of Porto, UEP57. Thus, UEP 
had to adopt a new policy of market agreements. Firstly, UEP and Varosa signed 
a six-year contract in 1931 for the distribution of electricity in the Porto region58. 
Secondly, the three companies –Varosa, CEHP and UEP-, endorsed the third 




Meanwhile, UEP had made a concerted effort to approach the Lisbon market and 
asked for authorization to study the placing of a HT tension line from Coimbra to 
Alcobaça in 1932, but the administrative process was promptly interrupted by the 
Central Administration in September60. Provided the approach to Lisbon was not 
granted from the North, UEP attempted to acquire SEUR, the company in the 
                                                 
53
 The news of the contract with these municipal services in: BD-UEP: 02/26/1920 and BD-UEP: 
10/23/1920 respectively. The contract with Braga was renewed in 1925: BD-UEP: 05/22/1925. 
54
 The concession of the HT line from Porto to Coimbra to Santo Tirso took place on 07/27/1928, in CD-
EDP-UEP- G4 24-10. The contract between UEP and Coimbra’s City Council in CD-EDP-FD 28-C4P1. 
This attempt to participate in the capital of competitors was only successful in the case of the small 
Companhia das Beiras. UEP participated in the capital increase in 1938 and 1941. BD-UEP: 10/06/1934. 
BD-UEP: 06/16/1938 and BD-UEP: 05/16/1941. There seemed to be another attempt to participate in 
other company in 1939: Serra de Estrela. BD-UEP: 11/10/1939. 
55
 UEP signed a mutual-help agreement with Carrís in 1931 which was still valid by 1939. 09/19/1931 
CD-EDP: UEP G4-2.2-3. 
56
 BD-UEP: 09/05/1925. The warning became a real difficulty to monopolize the market when Varosa 
signed an agreement with the town of Espinho in 1927. CD-UEP FD 28-C4P1. 
57
 De facto, CHENOP started to play its role in 1938, but became a company, de iure, in 1943, when the 
utility in the river Ave, N. Senhora do Porto was about to be inaugurated. Matos (2003 b), p. 121 and p. 
170; BD-UEP 03/26/1943. Bartolomé (2012). 
58
 The contract in CD-EDP: UEP G4-223 and references in BD-UEP: 04/25/1931. 
59
 In extenso, Bartolomé (2012). 
60
 The appeal in BD-UEP: 06/19/1932 and CD-EDP: UEP G4-2.2-3.  
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Setubal Peninsula south of Lisbon61. SEUR became part of UEP in 1941, but the 
project for a joint company network never materialized. During the 2
nd
 World 
War, the UEP had to sign market agreements in the South with the Companhia 
do Alto Alentejo for the distribution of the electricity in Evora62. In the North, 
new circumstances made UEP and their competitors interconnect their grids; the 
shortage of fuel led to a compulsory integration of the networks in order to make 
the system in the North more efficient63. 
To sum up, during the interwar period, UEP clearly intended to build a regional 
market in the North of Portugal centered in the city of Porto. This was 
demonstrated through the attempts of capturing energy resources, the absorption 
of adversaries and market agreements. By 1938, this policy did not work as 
expected. The firm's future was menaced by two circumstances: no waterpower 
alternatives to the uneven production from Lindoso and the diminishing share of 
the electricity market in the city of Porto. Let’s see whether the internal evolution 
of the company may shed some light on these aspects.  
 
5. UEP: a small and water-powered semi-Portuguese company  
 
UEP had been founded in 1919 as a joint venture of Electra del Lima, the 
Vizcaya’s generating company in North Portugal, and a Portuguese counterpart, 
headed by Banco Pinto e Sotto-Mayor64. UEP, as a semi-Portuguese company, 
was in charge of transforming and delivering all the energy generated in the 
waterfall of Lindoso to the Northern markets. The Banco de Vizcaya's electricity 
holding-group was not used to organizing the exploitation in a vertically 
integrated structure. The corporative strategy developed in some Spanish markets 
segregated the generating and distribution cycles into two different companies, 
controlled by the generating one65. Similarly, UEP was set up to distribute energy 
to the Northern urban markets using Iberian capital and entrepreneurship, but 
ruled by Lima66. Thus, UEP was registered in 1919 in Portugal as it was 
supposed to pave the way for acquiring licenses and authorizations when 
necessary.  
 
Regardless the initial attempts on behalf of the Portuguese and the Spanish group 
in order to preserve a good partnership in the UEP’s Board of Directors, the 
relationship among them was far from easy since the early times. The two Iberian 
partners held exactly the same stakes of the capital stock until 1945 even though 
it was increased four times (See table 1 in de Appendix)67. The Spanish group 
                                                 
61
 UEP purchased 9,875 shares of SEUR, capitalized only at 30%. BD-UEP: 09/19/1933. 
62
 BD-UEP 11/13/1942. 
63
 BD-UEP 03/26/1943.  
64
 Pinto e Sotto Mayor was formed in 1914. Câmara (1989). 
65
 The corporative strategy of the group, in Anes (2006). 
66
 UEP was founded on March 29
th
, 1919. The capital stock was 5 million Escudos. It was the biggest 
company in North Portugal. CD-EDP-UEP. Escritura. 
67
 The capital increases were as follows: 12/07/1926: 20,000,000 escudos; 03/27/1928: 34,000,000 
escudos; 06/11/1929: 40,000,000 escudos;12/23/1941 50,000,000 escudos. Estatutos UEP. CD-EDP-
UEP. Estatutos.  
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and Pinto e Sotto Mayor were each responsible for selling their part in their own 
country and the Board of Directors was formed by an equal number of 
Portuguese and Spanish members68. The positions of President and senior 
managers were held by Portuguese members and the Vice President, who was 
essentially the firm’s decision-maker, was Spanish69. There may only be some 
differences in the distribution of the securities issued by UEP, because the 
Portuguese Government was opposed to Spanish capitalists controlling a great 
portion of them70.  
 
Since the early times, constant disagreement among the two groups arose from 
the amounts to be paid to Lima as energy bills and the need for new investments. 
UEP was constrained to supply Porto exclusively with energy from Lima, 
although UEP was responsible for building a backup thermal power station i.e. 
Freixo and for maintaining the voltage of the whole electrical system. According 
to the Board of Directors Minute, the water-powered energy should be paid to 
Lima in golden currency and the retail prices would be fixed by agreement 
between the companies. Conversely, Lima would support UEP in case of 
competition with other distributors. Energy prices were initially determined in 
1922 when Lindoso was about to deliver electricity to Vila-nova de Gaia71; 
however, in 1925 the Portuguese group attempted to change prices for the first 
time and an energy contract between UEP and Lima was signed in 192672. When 
the Great Crisis triggered adjustments in the currencies that affected the 
payments to Lima, and in 1932 some changes in the price of hydroelectricity in 
relation to steam arose, Lima had to propose new procedures to compensate UEP 
though the divergences persisted until 194073.  
 
The strategy of financial investment was the second source of rivalry between the 
Portuguese' and the Spanish' group. According to UEP's sources, Lima was 
initially in charge of a significant share of the financial launch of UEP. 
Therefore, Lima –and the group of Spanish banks that supported the firm--
provided considerable loans to UEP to avoid any increase in the capital stock
74
. 
However, starting an electricity company was frequently difficult as the 1924 
UEP Assembly of stockholders revealed. The Portuguese group, which had not 
handed out any return on investment since 1919, expressed their lack of 
confidence in the electricity business and particularly in the Spanish managers. 
Apart from that, Vieira (from the Bank Pinto e Sotto-Mayor), the UEP's manager, 
                                                 
68
 In May 1934, Carlos Barbosa, President of UEP, declared in a letter to the Ministry of Public Works 
and Communications that each group had an equal share. CD-EDP-FD C5 P7.   
69
 César de la Mora was Vice President from 1925 until his death in 1937 and somehow maintained 
authority over strategic decisions.  
70
 The first issue of bonds was in British currency, but the successive calls were in Escudos. According to 






 BD-UEP-02/24/1932. BD-UEP-05/01/1935. BD-UEP-02/22/1937. A new draft bill was accepted in 
BD-UEP-02/02/1940. 
74
 BD-UEP-01/07/1925.  
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had recently left the company what made some suspicions aroused among 
shareholders. Actually, the holders were right because Vieira had committed 
fraud in October and left the firm without a trace. Thereafter, the company 




The disputes in the Board of Directors were compounded by the urgent increases 
in capital investment after 1925. Most of the investments were proposed by the 
Spanish group (i.e. generating facilities, Freixo; HT transport lines and the 
purchase of SEUR), but the Portuguese group felt these acquisitions threatened 
the UEP’s forthcoming returns76. This was particularly so between 1924 and 
1930 when a bank crisis in Porto coincided with a drop in the company’s initial 
paybacks thus making it difficult to gain the confidence of domestic investors. 
Thus, UEP's investments were all faced attempting to avoid the conflict between 
the groups. As the loans offered by the Spanish banks were considered very 
expensive by the Board of Directors, the UEP's assets were financed by capital 
stock increases from 1925 to 192977. According to the Board of Directors 
Minutes, the company chose an alternative means of raising funds after the Crash 
in 1929, and the state of affairs in the capital markets, and in order to avoid the 
rise in Portuguese industrial taxes: bond-shares. The UEP issued four securities 
series in British currency between 1931 and 193478. Thereafter, the subscriptions 
were in Portuguese currency and the rate of return was significantly lower. Thus, 
the main purpose of these contributions (between 1936 and the outbreak of 
World War II) was to redeem the heavy charge of the high interest rate of the 
previous series79. After the purchase of SEUR in 1941, there was yet another 
increase in stock capital80.  
Despite the background of divergences among the two Iberian groups during 
their early years, UEP followed a coherent investment policy. On the one hand, 
the enlargement of the company’s assets was financed by the increase in stock 
capital in three phases: the launch of the company, the building of Freixo and 
laying of transmission lines, and the purchase of SEUR. On the other hand, 
bonds and loans solved the company’s short-term liquidity problems81. However, 
the rhythm of expansion of the firm was significantly slower than the rest of the 
Spanish hydro-group82.  
                                                 
75
 General Assembly- GA-UEP-04/30/1924. Accounting Committee-AC-UEP-10/20/1924.   
76 BD-UEP: 07/01/1925; BD-UEP: 09/24/1927; BD-UEP: 12/22/1931. 
77
 The stock was increased three times up to 40 million Escudos. BD-UEP-12/31/1928. See Appendix, 
Table 1. 
78
 Bond-Series in British Currency: 1
st
: 200,000 at 7% in BD-UEP 01/03/1931; 2
nd
: 21,000 at 7.5 in BD-
UEP: 06/06/1931; 3
rd
: 50,000 at 7.5% BD-UEP 07/09/1933; 4
th
: at 6.5 BD-UEP 12/15/1934. 
79
 First: 100,000 escudos at 5 %. BD-UEP 02/27/1936; BD-UEP 12/14/1936. The redemption of the 
previous series at 7. 5%. The total amount of the redemption was 15,000,000 escudos, but the President 
suggested issuing only securities series for this amount at 5% because it was a favorable moment to sell. 
BD-UEP 06/16/1939: Redemption of securities series at 6.5%. 
80
 CD-EDP. Fundo UEP. Estatutos. 
81
 Loans were requested during the launch of the firm and 3 million escudos in 1935 to Lima and Pinto e 
Sotto-Mayor at 4.5 %. BD-UEP: 10/9/1935. 
82
 While the rate of growth of the output of Lima's group did not reach 14 % in the first 22 years of 
business, Hidroeléctrica Ibérica in the Vasco Country was almost 20% in the same period of time. 
Antolín (2006), p. 175 and Bartolomé (2009), p. 136. 
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Figure n. 4. Return on Investments (ROI): Electra de Lima, Hidrola, UEP (%)  
 
Sources: Source: UEP and Lima Board of Directors:  Annual Reports (1924-1944).  
 
The lack of confidence in the firm on behalf of the Portuguese group was not 
rooted in their poor results. The UEP budgets and accounting-reports do not 
reveal any significant liquidity and solvency problems and struggles were 
refunded by loans and securities
83
. The UEP figures prove the firm’s stability and 
resilience during this period. The firm’s rate of return on equities was especially 
favorable, although barely diminishing since 193384. Figure 4 compares the 
Return on Investment (ROI) of two generating companies of the same group i. e. 
Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola) and Lima and UEP. The ROI of Electra de 
Lima was significantly lower than the other generating company, Hidrola, and its 
evolution was uneven whilst UEP’s pace of growth improved greatly like that of 
some of the retailing companies of the eastern Hidrola’s market (See Figure 5).  
 
To recapitulate, the Portuguese partners proved to be uncomfortable with being 
got aside of the UEP’s decision-making and with the return on their investments, 
always being lower than their traditional commercial paybacks. UEP’s output 
pace of growth was increasingly slower and the obstacles imposed by the 
Administration to the company’s progress left uncertain futures. Regardless both 
internal and external challenges, UEP’s internal figures demonstrate that the 
company was a worthwhile investment when compared with similar Spanish 
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 Liquidity, Solvency and Treasure Ratios were always positive, especially Liquidity Ratios always over 
20%. UEP Board of Directors: Annual Reports (1922-1944). 
84 
When compares UEP’s ROI with the ratios of other important electricity companies in Spain up to the 
Spanish Civil War i.e. Ibérica, Hidrola, UEM, ERZ, Sevillana and Electra Madrid. UEP’s yields were 





















































































































electricity firms until 1938. In fact, up to 1933 Lima might have contributed to 
UEP’s returns selling energy at a lower price to UEP and this may well have 
happened in some years
85
. In addition, these high returns were likely to have 
another institutional origin: the symbiotic agreement between the company and 
the Municipality of Porto between 1923 and 1938
86
. However, the company’s 
future became uncertain, since the company expansion had been impeded and the 
statu-quo of the market of the city of Porto was broken from 1938 onwards.  
 
Figure n. 5. Return on Investments (ROI) of some Generating and Retailing Companies (1924-1934) (%) 
 
Sources: Source: UEP’s Boarding Committee:  Annual Reports (1922-1944) and some data from Antonio 
Hidalgo for the Spanish retailing companies.  
 
 
6. CRGE and Sofina, the great partner, in Lisbon, the self-contained 
market 
Gas firms had preceded electricity companies in Portugal as foreign capital 
investors and Lisbon was under the rule of Sofina as early as 191387. Sofina was 
the AEG’s Belgian holding-group and it had become a prominent stock-holder of 
the Lisbon’s company, CRGE; founded in 1891, it was the foremost electricity 
group in Portugal until its conversion in a semi-public operator as CNE in 1947. 
In Porto, CRGE also obtained an important part of the local delivery company in 
                                                 
85
 Essentially, a low percentage of UEP’s unit-income was used to pay energy from 1926 up to 1935. In 
terms of total unit-costs, the percentage for reimbursing energy varied but was rarely higher than 50%. 
Lima’s operating-ration was actually favorable to the interests of the Portuguese group up to the end of 
the Spanish Civil War when was reversed. Bartolomé (2009), figure 5. 
86
 See Bartolomé (2012). 
87 
Earlier foreign investors chose water-utilities and railway companies in 19
th
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1897, but they left Porto as soon as this service started being administered by a 
municipally owned company in 1919, which signed a contract to be supplied 
with hydropower by UEP in 1923.  
 
In 1887, public lighting in Lisbon was granted to a Belgian society, the 
Sociedade anonyme d'Eclairage du Centre, which formed a joint-stock company, 
the Companhia de Gás de Lisboa, with other foreign companies from Belgium 
and Germany
88
. In 1889 a new company, The Companhia de Gás entered the 
market and the competition ended up with a merger of the two companies in 
1891 when CRGE was founded.  Gas in Lisbon was a profitable business which 
had made it possible to pay out important dividends, around 25 per cent in the 
1887-1888
89
, but the expansion of the electricity compelled the firm to face 
important technological and financial challenges which might only be fulfilled 
with the participation of Sofina as of 1913. Sofina had been founded in 1898 and, 
since Heineman joined the firm in 1905 he organized the expansion of a technical 
and financial powerful holding-group. Thereafter, Sofina was a prominent 
example of the second wave of international groups involved in the setting up of 
electrical systems, featured by the use of AC in transmission and the building of 
electricity markets. Thus, in 1913, when Sofina became part of the CRGE, a flow 
of both capital and engineering expertise came from abroad
90
. The holding-group 
was responsible for building an important thermal power-plant in Bêlem which 
substituted the old Junqueira central plant (1909-1921). The new Tejo central 
plant was planned in 1914 but it started working in 1921. It stood for the core of 




 Sofina entered the firm in 1913 creating 96,000 new equity shares, which 
represented 43.6 percent of the total capital stock
92
. According to Matos and 
Silva (2004), an equal number of Portuguese and foreign members were to be 
maintained in the Board of Directors though foreign investors most profoundly 
impacted the decision-making of the firm. Until 1915, the company's chairman of 
the Board was always one of the Directors coming from abroad, but the 
Portuguese law specified a Portuguese member might be elected since then. As 
of 1914, Sofina appointed a certain number of directors --at least four in a Board 
of Directors of sixteen-- and the other foreign companies linked to the firm were 
neglected and reduced to portfolio partners. Similarly, general management of 
the company and technical control were entrusted to Sofina's staff, which exerted 




CRGE's capital stock was enlarged at least three times until 1928. Thereafter, it 
was maintained unchanged until 1945, regardless the central plant was being 
                                                 
88
 Matos and Silva (2004), p. 147. 
89
 Matos and Silva (2004), p. 147, footnote 18. 
90
 CRGE, Board of Directors, General Meetings, 1914. 
91
 Barbosa, Cruz, Faria (2007). 
92
 This percentage shrank to 22 % in 1948 and 15.2 percent in 1957. Bussola (2011), p. 169. According to 
Matos and Silva (2004, p. 155), Sofina was a larger share-holder (68 percent of capital). 
93
 Matos and Silva (2004), p. 150-157. 
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expanded during those tough times. As far as we know, different items, like 




Figure n. 6. CRGE’s and UEP’s ROI (in percentage) 
 
 
Sources: Appendix. Table n. 1 and n. 4. 
 
The electricity market in the city of Lisbon grew as the consumption of energy 
did, but the gas revenues accounted for 20 percent of the total income of the firm 
as late as 1938. During World War II, the gas business even grew (around a 5 
percent of total CRGE's income
95
. Industrial and manufacture consumption was 
the main important use of electricity for the company, although it started 
broadcasting household appliances in the 1930s in order to improve the 
productivity figures of the whole electrical equipment
96
. The transmission lines 
went beyond the city's boundaries, but not so far, as may be confirmed in Map n. 
1. During the 1920s and 1930s, CRGE produced half of the total electricity 
output in Portugal, but the essential paybacks came from a small but fruitful 
market, that of the city of Lisbon, where distribution lines were laid at a tireless 
pace along these years
97
. Thus, CRGE showed to be barely interested in broaden 
its market and building a regional market if this imposed new and remarkable 
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 The information from the enlargement of the capital stock in CRGE, in Board of Directors, General 
Meetings (1914-1945).Unfortunately, there is no research based on CRGE that follows a Business History 
approach. Thus, we still ignore most of the internal history of this company. The information from the 
enlargement of the capital-stock in CRGE, in (1914-1945). 
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 CRGE, Board of Directors, General Meetings, (1922-1945). 
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  Motive power added up 70 percent of CRGE’s purchased electricity and 52 percent of total output in 
1937.  Board of Directors, General Meetings: 1937. 
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investments during the difficult times of the Great Depression and last 1930s. 
ROI maintained rather high, as can be seen in Figure n. 6. CRGE's return on 
investments was always higher than that of UEP and it maintained stable until 
last thirties
98
. From 1938 onwards the increasing cost of coal affected seriously 
the company's yields
99
. This circumstance almost coincided with UEP’s decline 
of paybacks and their struggles in the electricity market of Porto. Both preceded 
the Government implementation of the new plan of connecting markets and 
building hydro-power new power plants in order to avoid the use of the 
expensive coal.  
 
7. Demanding governmental support in the 1940s 
 
The two main markets for electricity in Portugal were supplied by foreign 
companies between 1922 and 1944 i.e. CRGE in Lisbon and UEP in the Portos’s 
Region. Regardless the important differences in financial capacity and essentially 
technological expertise, the powerful Sofina and the still nascent Lima's Group 
organized fairly similar. They both turned out to be important equity's holders in 
their respective companies and they controlled the firms from Paris and Madrid 
respectively, but Portuguese capital was also involved in both firms. Despite 
there is no evidence on the occasional disputes in the CRGE's Board of Directors 
among the indigenous group and that coming from abroad, internal evidence 
shows how fierce was the reciprocal disagreement among foreign and domestic 
investors in the UEP, making their early years problematic. Similarly to other 
foreign investors, the Lima's Group coped with the inherent difficulties of 
exporting utilities at different currencies in the thirties and also managed to resist 
the opposition of the Portuguese group to the never-ending increase of scale of 
the hydro-powered system and the subsequent rising demand of new funds. 
 
However, there existed some important differences among how both holding-
groups evolved in Portugal during this period. On the one hand, CRGE supplied 
Lisbon with thermal electricity and once the Tejo's Power House was working, 
the company obtained an increasingly higher yield on investments without 
augmenting the capital-stock. Sofina was obtaining additional revenues by means 
of the payment of overheads for the financial and technical assistance and, as far 
as we know, the holding-group retained easily the control of CRGE since the rest 
of the share-holders were somewhat dispersed. Though one attempt was made in 
river Zêzere there existed no sign the firm intended decisively to enlarge their 
market by adding water-powered facilities during the 1930s. On the other hand, 
the water-powered distributor, UEP, faced a small and at some point diminishing 
market in Porto. It was absolutely imperative for the company augmenting the 
size of the market by placing lines, signing new contracts with municipalities and 
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 Sofina enjoyed also remarkable overheads for the financial or technical assistance provided that did not 
interrupted but increased after the World War II what implies Sofina maintained always a good 
partnership in this business. Matos and Silva (2004), p. 157 and Bussola (2011), p. 189. 
99
 Conversely, Reserves and Redemptions grew enormously as of 1938. This shows how CRGE initiated 
a defensive policy in order to preserve the company to the tough times. Appendix, Table 4. 
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being granted for the use of additional water resources by the Government. The 
atmosphere of distrust among the company’s managers made this expansion 
lightly difficult, but government rulers were the ones to impede a major progress 
of the company during the interwar period in North Portugal. As a result, having 
followed remarkably different paths of growth, neither UEP nor CRGE went far 
beyond the burdens of their urban markets of electricity from 1922 up to 1944.  
 
The CRGE's level of return on investment was always above of that of UEP, 
what is common to other thermal-powered electricity companies. In addition, 
UEP's yield on investments began slowly to shrink from the early thirties 
onwards whilst CRGE's difficulties only started with the fuel-shortage in the eve 
of the 2
nd 
World War. This coincided with UEP’s difficulties in the market of the 
city of Porto. Then, the Salazar's Plan would be welcome by both companies, 
since every new investment would be backed and guaranteed by the state. This 
coincidence of the CRGE’s difficulties with the implementation of the 
Governmental Plan might suggest that the proximity of the company to the 
decision-making centers and the size of the international company i.e. Sofina 
made a difference. In fact, having opened some open-tenders in the 1930swith a 
view of supporting an electrification project, it was only during the shortage of 
fuel, which seriously affected CRGE that the cooperation among public and 
foreign operators came into effect. Then, governmental support emerged as a 
vital need for electrification provided Portugal was a poor electrified country, 
though the own Government had impeded the expansion of foreign firms during 
the previous years. 
Collaboration with public operator was indispensable not only because capital 
was scarce, but also the ascent of public intervention since during the 1930s, this 
government had impeded an electrification progress in Portugal fostered by both 
new and already settled promoters. Contrary to one may expect, the 
electrification ruled by the state in the 1940s and 1950s was told as being a 
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Table A-1. UEP’s Balance Sheet and Electricity Output (1922-1945) 
(1-5 in thousands of Portuguese Escudo) 





























1922 5,000   438 59 895       
1923 5,000   2,691 59 3,361 8,898     
1924 5,100   4,720 237 5,040 15,653     
1925 5,062   4,632 547 5,797 19,101   15,147 
1926 20,130   2,761 1,622 12,058 21,541   17,947 
1927 24,408   2,897 1,583 25,520 26,787   21,416 
1928 34,356   2,348 938 32,418 33,439   27,088 
1929 40,566   1,753 1,139 40,907 37,592   34,434 
1930 40,829 5,123 2,744 1,264 44,814 46,410   38,432 
1931 41,108 10,523 3,595 1,401 50,503 51,000   41,459 
1932 41,387 10,523 4,976 1,505 49,555 58,856   48,490 
1933 41,783 15,947 3,199 1,545 50,573 65,417   52,797 
1934 43,283 16,262 2,883 2,071 49,501 71,638   57,913 
1935 44,804 21,689 4,551 1,960 49,649 73,482   58,955 
1936 46,295 31,502 6,133 1,850 48,253 85,645   60,720 
1937 47,761 30,500 6,134 10,395 45,598 93,060   64,055 
1938 51,200 27,750 6,712 11,416 45,300 98,639   68,316 
1939 55,144 25,000 3,180 10,703 46,847 94,918   61,788 
1940 58,826 24,816 2,366 11,762 47,087 92,598   59,533 
1941 72,238 22,435 3,156 11,156 72,163 102,948   71,361 
1942 75,738 18,034 1,504 3,956 77,799 118,142 4,667 80,394 
1943 79,538 17,613 1,169 5,465 81,461 109,708 17,967 105,420 
1944 81,558 30,000 2,431 5,655 86,759 122,870 19,122 118,750 
1945 81,603 29,131   3,323   135,330 12,957 135,330 
Source: Board of Directors: Annual Reports. Lima (1924-1945) and UEP (1924-1945).  
Electricity Output, see Bartolomé (2009).
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5. HT lines 
in km 
1923 8,898   8,898     
1924 15,653   15,653   75 
1925 19,101 15,147 19,101   110 
1926 21,541 17,947 21,541   115 
1927 26,787 21,416 26,787   149 
1928 33,439 27,088     234 
1929 37,592 34,434     402 
1930 46,410 38,432     612 
1931 51,000 41,459     665 
1932 58,856 48,490 53,576   697 
1933 65,417 52,797     711 
1934 71,638 57,913     731 
1935 73,482 58,955     845 
1936 74,986 60,720     904 
1937 79,934 64,055     965 
1938 84,905 68,316     977 
1939 78,912 61,788     1,002 
1940 74,684 59,533     1,005 
1941 83,807 71,372 71,252   1,054 
1942 92,930 80,394 89,382 4,667 1,084 
1943 84,253 84,162 67,913 17,967 1,110 
1944 91,922 93,032 79,641 19,122 1,116 
1945 110,427 103,158 87,181 12,957 1,128 
Source: Board of Directors: Annual Reports. Lima (1924-1945) and UEP (1924-1945). 
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1924 11,259 5,040 1,563 2,802 1,239 824 
1925 11,583 5,797 1,691 3,047 1,356 831 
1926 25,243 12,058 1,856 3,429 1,573 1,394 
1927 33,057 25,520 1,641 4,598 2,957 2,703 
1928 42,682 32,418 2,672 6,840 4,197 3,842 
1929 51,582 40,907 4,251 9,499 5,247 4,875 
1930 56,937 44,814 3,728 9,292 5,564 5,134 
1931 62,641 50,503 5,680 11,271 5,590 4,335 
1932 67,571 49,555 6,310 14,235 7,925 4,476 
1933 73,982 50,573 5,462 15,458 9,995 5,000 
1934 74,244 49,501 5,548 15,973 10,425 5,026 
1935 82,066 49,649 6,140 15,879 9,819 4,989 
1936 94,089 48,253 7,272 16,586 9,315 4,559 
1937 94,316 45,598 7,574 16,351 8,777 4,527 
1938 96,212 45,300 7,344 16,218 8,873 4,532 
1939 93,445 46,847 6,238 14,892 8,654 4,519 
1940 95,531 47,087 6,285 14,517 8,232 4,494 
1941 111,604 72,163 8,550 17,567 9,017 5,635 
1942 115,069 77,799 8,456 18,250 9,793 6,280 
1943 114,779 81,461 7,679 15,386 7,707 5,224 
1944 131,509 86,759 9,340 17,227 7,887 6,000 
1945     9,673 17,377 7,705 6,000 













Table A-4. CRGE: some figures from Badgets and Accounting Reports(in 
thousand Portuguese Escudo) 







1924 55,611 940 1,321 
1925 55,611 3,632 8,220 
1926 55,611 5,350 12,709 
1927 55,611 7,955 15,569 
1928 73,611 10,690 18,274 
1929 73,611 13,465 18,896 
1930 73,611 23,750 17,494 
1931 73,611 35,750 19,234 
1932 73,611 29,513 21,518 
1933 73,611 31,513 24,274 
1934 73,611 33,513 30,718 
1935 73,611 38,513 30,708 
1936 73,611 44,230 34,154 
1937 73,611 110,151 36,687 
1938 73,611 122,842 34,679 
1939 73,611 129,868 31,166 
1940 73,611 147,813 28,621 
1941 73,611 157,841 18,831 
1942 73,611 171,408 7,455 
1943 73,611 171,408 7,414 
1944 73,611 137,302 7,228 
1945 172,000 171,408 10,217 
Source: Board of Directors: Annual Reports. CRGE (1921-1945). 
